

On the Features and Significance of Aesthetical Judgment

Jiangdong Shan*

I. Introduction

Among humanistic philosophers in modern Europe, Kant was strikingly distinguished in elaborating human faculty of cognition, which constituted the substantial themes of his critical philosophy. The faculty, as the epistemological basis of human mental power, is further divided into three parts, namely, theoretical faculty, practical faculty and aesthetical faculty which pointing to three realms relative to human intellectual domains. For theoretical faculty, it has definite function in achieving the certainties of objective laws of the natural world; for practical faculty, it has a peculiar role in explaining the moral necessity justifying human social practice, and for aesthetical faculty, it functions as the mediator between theoretical and practical faculties as they are paralleled as separated legislators for both natural world and human society respectively. Yet this separation often contradicts human beings who would integrate his objective understating the nature with his subjective reason in justifying his practice, therefore, the mediatory faculty in the form of judgment becomes obligatory in alleviating this mental tension or theoretical contradiction in Kantian system.

II. The Features of Judgment

Before Kant, the essentials of human beings are either defined as “rational animal” or “social animal” attributed to the credit of Aristotle (Renford Bambrough, 1963: 431-432). Philosophers, ever since, either have been emphasizing the intellectual faculty or the social sense of responsibility of human beings, resulting in confusion by separating human beings in dichotomy of biological aptitude and moral orientation. In order to clear up this confusion, Kant committed himself to reinterpreting human beings basically from the frame of human intrinsic faculties, which, he assumed, could bridge the gap in human nature, integrating human moral sense as social animal with his intellectual capacities as rational animal, and in this context, Kant might have defined human as ‘emotional animal’, a complementary attribute to Aristotelian definition of man by underscoring the feature of feeling as human intellectual faculty.

Such philosophical commitment led Kant in dividing human intrinsic capacities into three kinds, theoretical, practical and aesthetical. As these intrinsic capacities all have their a priori forms, independent of other substantial conditions in content, they are also defined as reasons, that is, the theoretical reason, practical reason and aesthetical reason. These distinctive reasons, in Kantian

* Jiangdong Shan, Ph.D. candidate at Philosophy Institute Free University of Berlin.

Critique Philosophy, constitute the three parts of philosophy, namely, the theoretical, the practical and the aesthetic. At the very beginning, Kant set about constructing the organic frame of the philosophy by introducing these distinct yet correlative parts, he thus stated: “Now there are only two kinds of concepts, and these admit as many distinct principles of the possibility of their objects, viz, natural concepts and the concept of freedom. The former render possible theoretical cognition according to principles a priori; the latter in respect of this theoretical cognition only supplies in itself a negative principle (that of mere contrast), but on the other hand it furnishes fundamental propositions which extend the sphere of the determination of the will and are therefore called practical. Thus philosophy is correctly divided into two parts, quite distinct in their principles; the theoretical part or Natural Philosophy, and the practical part or Moral Philosophy (for that is the name given to the practical legislation or Reason in accordance with the concept of freedom).”(Bernard, 2005: 5) If his theoretical cognition can be illustrated as the human faculty in providing principles of certainty for nature, then human beings could be understood as the legislator for nature. By similar reference, we may also depict human beings as the legislator for himself, since he could also provide moral principles in guiding his social practice of his own free will. Hence we are now exposed to the contradictory natures in human faculties, one directing at the certainties of law in nature, another at the freedom of law in practice, yet in human practice how could certainty and freedom be reconciled? Definitely they cannot be reconciled by mathematical parity, since certainty and freedom, objective nature and subjective will do not belong to the same category and hence not applicable to one-dimensional calculation. Let’s suppose if the one-dimensional calculation could be fairly operated, we have to depend on human intellectual faculty, which serves as the very basis for both principles of certainty in nature and principles of morality in practice, and thus in the final analysis, free will or moral law has logical preference to natural laws of certainty. The reason could be simple and clear: if the legislator is not initially motivated by his free will, the following legislation for nature would not automatically start.

Now we come to another question in consequence, namely, why should human beings initiate his legislation either for nature or for his practice? The answer might be that he is motivated by purpose in his legislations, the concept of purposiveness, as I understand, is the representation of innate form of cognition that connects natural law and moral law in human process of understanding the natural world and reasoning out his moral practice. The purposiveness could represent the world of feeling that connect the world of nature with the world of morality where its forms are pure and a priori, which follow their own ways in moving from the natural world to moral world, and their faculty in the form of Judgment could operate in bridging the Understanding to the Reason, motivating the purposefulness of nature to that of man as the ultimate purpose of nature, realizing the absolute good in the world of feeling.

As the intermediate faculty between Understanding and Reason, Judgment is also elaborated by Kant as the form a priori in conformity with the forms a priori in Understanding and Reason. These are quality, quantity, relation, and modality. In the aesthetical faculty in feeling the architecture of the pleasant, the beautiful, the sublime and the good (absolutely or perfect good), Kant interpreted these four forms a priori in correlation with the above-mentioned classification of subjective feelings as to show human innate predilection towards freedom, thus insinuating the predomination of moral law over natural law: “The pleasant, as motive of desire, is always of one and the same kind, no matter whence it comes and however specifically different the representation (of sense, and sensation objectively considered) may be. Hence in judging its influence on the mind, account is taken only of the number of its charms (simultaneous and successive), and so only of the mass, as it were, of the pleasant sensation; and this can be made intelligible only by quantity. It has no reference to culture, but belongs to mere enjoyment. –On the other hand, the beautiful requires the representation of a certain quality of the Object, that can be made intelligible and reduced to concepts (although it is not so reduced in an aesthetical judgment); and it cultivates us, in that it teaches us to attend to the purposiveness in the feeling of pleasure.–The sublime consists merely in the relation by which the sensible in the representation of nature is judged available for a possible supersensible use.– The absolutely good, subjectively judged according to the feeling that it inspires (the Object of the moral feeling), as capable of determining the powers of the subject through the representation of an absolutely compelling law, is specially distinguished by the modality of a necessity that rests a priori upon concepts. This necessity involves not merely a claim, but a command for the assent of everyone, and belongs in itself to the pure intellectual, rather than to the aesthetical Judgment; and is by a determinant and not a mere reflective judgment ascribed not to Nature but to Freedom.”(Bernard, 2005: 79-80) By paralleling the concepts of pleasant, beautiful, sublime and good with the objective attributes of their judging targets either in the forms of art or nature, Kant would stick to the clues of faculty of cognition starting from the law of certainty to the law of freedom, i.e. from the world of nature to the kingdom of morality, testifying the validity and values of Judgment. This parallel of aesthetical faculties and their corresponding purposiveness revealed in Kantian table is further explained in daily seeing-is-believing model: “Appealing to a biological analogy, one might say that just as the function of the eye, namely, to see, may be broken down into several sub-functions, such as color, shape, and distance vision, so the function of the understanding, namely, to judge, may be broken down into four (and only four) types of sub-function: quantity, quality, relation, and modality.” (Allison, 2004: 137) Whatever objects by our aesthetical faculty, we judge them firstly in their phenomenon by generic function, and the numbers of object in our judgment might be accumulated to certain degree that led to a category as a positive result of subjective experience of interest. When the concept generated from category is expressive of object in quality, we no longer take trouble in recalling or calculating our experience of interest in ascertaining the

quantity of objects in cognition, so the quality of object becomes disinterested, that is, the quantified object has achieved by man's faculty of cognition the predicate universal. So in the quality, interested experience in quantity has been emptied into disinterested universality. Like individual might feel pleased in certain object, the feeling for beautiful object might be identical to everyone, therefore, beauty is shared universally in its quality much the same as certain object pleases individual quantitatively. In the form of quantity, one man's beat might be rejected as another's poison, while in the form of quality, flower is appreciated universally as the representation of beauty. As for the function of relation, if we could connect the concepts of "quantity" and "quality" in our aesthetical judgment, it naturally betrays the function of relation in our faculty that facilitates this connection. Itself as mediatory faculty in our judgment, "relation" could bridge the gap in reflective Judgment in the form of "quantity" and "quality", it also establishes the ties between things in phenomena and things-in-themselves, or the ties between sensible things to the purposiveness of their supersensible possibilities. In Chinese proverb, we often state: "The sight of one falling leave is enough to tell the soon arrival of austere autumn." Our aesthetical faculty to connect the falling leave to austere autumn adequately testifies our innate form of "relation" as pure judgment. As for "modality", Alisson offered a very simple interpretation: "modality is concerned with the relation between a particular judgment and a given body of knowledge. It thus concerns what one might term the 'epistemic value' of a judgment ('the value of copula'), and the function of modality is to integrate a judgment within a presupposed system of knowledge."(Allison, 2004: 139) As a special function type in Judgment, "modality" does not follow either the natural law of certainty or the moral law of necessity, it is the presentation of conscience, which commands all the previous three types of aesthetical judgment functioning as their invisible motivation as well as their epistemological base. In contrast to other three types of judgment, "modality" can be comprehended as the determinant form of necessity in aesthetical cognition. It does not care about what object to be judged, what concept to be generated and what relations to be established between the representation of interest in quantity and the representation of disinterested in quality, it remains always committed to the form of necessity in judgment: if there is judgment, it invariably follows the functional type of "quantity" to "quality" by means of "relation".

Finally, the architecture of functional types in aesthetical judgment can be paralleled to a unit of purposiveness as expressed in the form of the pleasant (interested in quantity), the beautiful (disinterested in quality), the sublime (from sensible natural sense to supersensible moral sense in relation), and the absolute good (the epistemological value guiding judgment process in modality). These could be the attributes of judgment in forms a priori, which distinguish themselves in purposiveness in the world of subjective feeling from the laws of certainty in natural world and the laws of necessity in moral world, channeling us all the way to dialectics between the aesthetical faculties and their corresponding purposiveness.

III. Purposiveness in Aesthetical Judgment

Purposiveness in Kantian philosophy is closely associated with the concepts of practical reason since it functions mainly by man's subjective faculty by free feeling the sense of the pleasant, the beautiful, the sublime and the absolute good. As we know, in theoretical reason, our faculty only functions in the form of causality of heteronomy for nature, its purposiveness is thus seen in the representation of objects in their possible nature. By Kantian definition, purposiveness is the property of a concept in its aesthetical judgment. And as the judgment can be expressed in the form theoretical and practical reason, purposiveness is thus understood as the human intellectual significance given to its reflective objects, whether they are human beings in his moral practice or other beings in their nature.

Some scholars would refer purposiveness as the derivative from the purpose, so they set to explaining the concept primarily from "purpose" with Kantian own clue: "the purpose is the object of a concept, in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept in respect of its Object is its purposiveness (forma finalis). Where then not merely the cognition of an object, but the object itself (its form and existence) is thought as an effect only possible by means of the concept of this latter, there we think a purpose." (Bernard, 2005: 40) Here we may build a link between the nature of objects and the aesthetical judgment of reflective subject, man as a rational animal in this context, and this link consequently can reveal to us the purposiveness of the object. "Thus, purposiveness is now treated as the property of a concept, specifically, the property of having causality with regard to its object (a purpose). Presumably, to have such causality is to have purposive form." (Allison, 2001: 121) By purposive form of causality, our aesthetical judgment justifies us in presenting our reflective objects in the discursive term rather than intuitive term. For example, the sunshine can be judged as the radiated rays of the sun in its natural property as well as the generous donation of heat necessary to all lives on earth in its moral necessity. So the purposiveness of natural property and moral freedom in the sun is expressed in the copula of human aesthetical judgment. There we see the transition of sunshine in the form of "quantity" and "quality" to the form of "relation" and "modality", accompanied by purposiveness in concepts of "pleasure" and "beauty" as well as the concepts of "sublime" and "good". In the similar reference, the purposiveness presupposes the link between the objective causality and the subjective freedom, alluding to the mediatory intellectual faculty of Judgment between Understanding and Reason.

In the judgment of taste, Kant explored extensively the essence of purposiveness as peculiar representations of human faculty. To him, an object or piece of art or the Nature does not only serve as the target of human understanding, but also serves as the target of human appreciation in the form of subjective feeling. Thus the beauty or the merit of taste is not obtained from the material property of the object, but produced by its form gratifying human subjective anticipation.

This subjective anticipation as the purposive form in taste can be analogical to moral freedom in the principle of “autonomy”: “Kant distinguished, in strict analogy to the moral problem, between empirical (heteronomous) and pure (autonomous) judgment: ‘A judgment of taste...is only pure so far as its determining ground is tainted with no merely empirical delight. But such a taint is always present where charm[Reiz] or emotion [Rührung] have a share in the judgment by which something is to be described as beautiful.’ Rather, a ‘pure’ form of delight was associated with the immanent determination of the mental process expressed in the proposition: in the case of the pure moral choice, ‘respect,’ and in the case of the judgment of taste, beauty. These two feelings, in their purity, i.e., their abstraction from any determining interest in the material gratification that might empirically be bound up with them, betokened or ‘marked’ the intrinsic and rational determination of the mental activity which occasioned them.” (Zammito, 1992: 93) Therefore in the structure of taste judgment, purposiveness of object as art or nature in myriad of forms can best exhibit the free play of autonomy of man as both the initiator and beneficiary in the process of aesthetical judgment. The purposiveness represented in the aesthetical judgment remind me much of the features of mental activity when Chinese philosopher endeavors to elaborate the moral charms in painting horse. Feng Yulan (1895-1990), an influential contemporary Confucian philosopher, wrote in his last essay: “In the poem of Du Fu in ancient there were these lines as ‘When his majesty emperor dictated a military painter to draw a horse, he had been thus conceiving with all painstaking and prudence. When the dictated horse was drawn, the modality of a flying dragon just exposed all the charms of horse.’...This poem reveals the sense of art, which bases itself on natural horse yet achieves the charms of dragon as the purposive model of horse in its best possibility.” (Feng Yulan, 2000: Vol. 14, p.349) In his elaboration, the poet praised the painted horse not in its physically being plump and sturdy, but the feature of marching gallop imagined as attributes to a flying dragon. Such modality in a flying dragon functions in our aesthetical judgment the abstracting being plump and sturdy from individual observing physical horse of interest pleasing experience and the relating galloping to flying dragon. The purposiveness in painting the horse and in appreciating the painting discloses the sense of modality that the painted horse is not the physical horse, but the attributes ascribed to a flying dragon might adequately serve as the model for us to breed and train horse as well as to appreciate horse. A similar example is extended to the commentary of a master artist in Peking Opera, namely, Master Mei Lanfang. The role he plays is exclusively female, then the commentary goes: “The female played by male reveals all the prettiness that female could have had.” By this modality, in collaboration with Kantian aesthetical judgment, we can really feel the sense of emotional ontology or “the value of copula” in Alison, subjectively wishing everything fully realize its possibilities.

IV. Ethical Ontology Suggested by Nature

Kant was not an artist, nor did he travel a lot as to compare the natural beauties of the scenic spots in different resorts. What had been applicable to his aesthetical judgment was the nature as an organic art piece of the creator, to the reference of which he could explain the fabric of his theory and generate the ultimate purposiveness of the nature.

In J.H. Bernard's introduction to his translation of *Critique of Judgment*, he illustrated the Kantian features in analyzing the regulative principles in nature as art of the creator with causality and morality: "The fundamental principle underlying the procedure of the Judgment is seen to be that of the purposiveness of Nature; nature is everywhere adapted to ends or purposes, and thus constitutes a *κόσμος*, a well-ordered whole. By this means, nature is regarded by us as if its particular empirical laws were not isolated and disparate, but connected and in relation, deriving their unity in seeming diversity from an intelligence which is at the source of nature. It is only by the assumption of such a principle that we can construe nature to ourselves; and the principle is then said to be a transcendental condition of the exercise of our judging faculty." (Bernard, 2005: xii) By our faculty of cognition, there are harmonious arrangement among the natural beings in the world, unifying the whole organic picture of the creation by the dialectic relations between means and end. The recession of the ocean serves as means to the end of providing the expansion of beach soil, which serves as means to the end of the prosperous growth of pines, and this might be an infinite chain of mechanic causality in natural world. Yet as we see the dialectic relations between means and end, we have to notice the message revealed as cosmological morality in this chain of regulative principles which constitutes the human culture distinctive of natural mechanics. This human culture projected upon the nature help to transform cosmological mechanics into the purposiveness of nature, i.e. the nature as mechanic world has been turned into a world of value by human culture in his free play of aesthetical judgment.

By focusing on "relation" between the sensible beings and the supersensible possibilities, Kant hinted at moral message both behind the mechanic principles in nature and logic principles in the faculty of cognition. If any thing in the natural world can serve as means to the end of others, this definitely presupposes the moral principle in the whole nature. Then if we ask for the purposiveness of nature as God's creation, we are thereof exposed to the world of culture, where nothing serves only as means to end, but everything has end in itself, i.e. no man will be treated as mere means to the end of others, every person has end in himself. The modality of this cultural world will lead to the purposiveness of the natural world, as Kant reiterated in the Second Part of his book: *Critique of the Teleological Judgment*: "As the only being on earth which has an Understanding and, consequently, a faculty of setting arbitrary purposes before itself, he is certainly entitled to be the lord of nature; and if it be regarded as a teleological system he is, by his destination, the ultimate purpose of nature." And man as the "ultimate purpose of nature" is

distinguished in “The production of the aptitude of a rational being for arbitrary purposes in general (consequently in his freedom) is culture. Therefore, culture alone can be the ultimate purpose which we have cause for ascribing to nature in respect to the human race (not man’s earthly happiness or the fact that he is the chief instrument of instituting order and harmony in irrational nature external to himself).” (Bernard, 2005: 210) In his interpretation of man as the final purpose of nature, we have the answer in Kant the purposiveness of nature, i.e. the man full of morality, evidenced in his free will by means of comparison to the faculties of Understanding which makes a rational man and of Judgment which makes a cultural man. By the introduction of the purposiveness of nature into man, we can have a better understanding of man as end in the universe with his dignity superior to his faculties in nature as Understanding and in emotion as Judgment, his dignity identifying his freedom with pure reason in understanding and modality in purposiveness, and finally he is assumed to have identified himself with God, his most morally projected spiritual icon.

If the purposiveness of nature in man can be termed as his dignity both logically distinguished from and ethically superior to his faculties of cognition, it might properly serve as the cogent mediatory agent to bridge and alleviate the schism in man with heteronomy of biological being as well as autonomy of free will. This shows the intellectual feats of Kantian Critique Philosophy by dividing philosophy into three parts, theoretical, practical and aesthetic and by identifying man with God by means of purposiveness. Yet these feats are achieved at the cost of theoretical brevity and practical feasibility. But in Chinese Confucian philosophy, similar intellectual feats are exemplified in the modality of “integration between heaven and man”(tianren heyi) . In a moral cosmology, heaven is God to man in that it created everything physical and metaphysical, both mechanical and moral feats for the world where human is created ordained to be God’s incarnate. And within this Confucian moral cosmology, there are three distinctive schools, the heaven-rational school(*tianlipai*), the heart-nature-mandate school(*xinxingpai*), and the air-cosmological school(*qimingpai*). Among these three schools of Confucian philosophy, the heart-nature-mandate school is extremely attentive to interpreting the relations between the heart faculty and the ethical ontology of the cosmos, and this school is usually attributive to three Confucian thinkers, Zi Si (483-402 B.C.), the grandson of Confucius, Mencius (372-289 B.C.), apprenticed to pupil of Zi Si, and Lu Jiuyuan(1139-1193 A.D.), a master scholar in Neo-Confucianism.

In the Doctrine of the Mean, Zi Si started with this to stress the relations between heaven’s mandate and nature of all beings in the universe: “The universal nature has been destined by heaven’s mandate, to attest this universal nature is to apply Dao or cosmological dynamics, to inculcate Dao is to carry out education. What can be called Dao is inherent in everything, or it cannot be Dao. Therefore a gentleman should be diligent on what is invisible, be vigilant on what

is inaudible. With its subtlety, cosmological entity cannot be visibly senses, being the absolute otherness as Cosmological One, so a gentleman should be sanctimoniously aware of the Cosmological One.” (Bojun, 1989: 294) Nature as immanent property in everything is thought to be the evidence of heaven’s mandate, but this nature in human has two specific features, to be rational with faculty of cognition and to be morally aware of understanding the universal doctrine in terms of Dao. It clearly stated the nature of all beings and man’s intellectual commitment to comprehend the nature, but it did not tell how human education could be conducted and why human is capable of receiving education.

Here comes the turn of Mencius in his interpretation about the human heart as the organ of intellectual cognition and moral engine. He believes that the function of heart is to reflect the doctrines manipulating all beings in the universe and manifests the cardinal virtue of the cosmos. His is highly reputed for this insightful observation about man in his fullest sense: “One who works out with his heart completely apprehends the nature of all things in the universe, in such case he comes to understand whatever the heaven mandates. So human being is anticipated to fulfill his heart’s function to think affectionately and harmonize his heart with universal natures for the vocations destined by heaven’s mandate. Such a holy determination will not alter despite one’s being shorter or longer life expectancy, and this is the heavenly mandates being performed by man.” (Bojun, 1989: 446) Such a heart in man with functions of intellectual faculty and moral doctrine as to witness the universal rights for everything to survive encourages Mencius to propose the concept of feeling to be the “grand husband”(*dazhangfu*), who marries the cosmos by cultivating himself with air as cosmic substance permeating in the universe that “grand husband is one who won’t be seduced to being obscenely rich, who won’t give in because of being poor and plebeian, and who won’t reconcile himself to coercion.” (Bojun, 1989: 403) In referring to his interpretations on heart, nature, heavenly mandates, Confucian scholars generated the “theory of heart-nature-mandate”, personifying in “grand husband”.

Among Neo-Confucian scholars, Lu Jiuyuan was generally regarded as another outstanding exponent of the “theory of heart-nature-mandate”. His concise yet comprehensive illustration on the relation between heart, reason, truth and saint just convince Chinese in the belief that cosmic conscience originated in human heart can adequately transform everyone into a saint: “The cosmos is nothing larger than my heart, and my heart is nothing smaller than the cosmos. If a Saint were born in the East Sea, his heart and mind should be thus invested; if a Saint were born in the West Sea, his heart and mind should be thus invested; if a Saint were born in the Southern and Northern Seas, his heart and mind should also be thus invested. If a Saint had been born in the past by hundred or thousand generations, he could have been thus invested; if a Saint will be born in the future by hundred or thousand generations, he might also be thus invested.”(Jiuyuan, 1980: 483) The ideas revealed this quotation are of monumental significance to Chinese intellectuals and

thus merit some clarifications in detail. First, the heart-cosmos modality is the prototype of “the integration between heaven and man”(tianrenheyi) as the manifestation of grand virtue partaking in everyman or everything. We often hear Chinese praising the virtue of patience or tolerance by saying literally: “Yield for a moment, and the wind shall calm and the wave subside; Take a step back, and the sea is broad and the sky open.” Here the speaker employs the cosmic elements of wind, wave, sea and sky as the means to disclose his mentality of virtue in patience or tolerance, which also presupposes the limit of patience or tolerance, i.e. the exclusion of violating cosmic principles as fairness for everything to exist and survive and reciprocity of good will in the cosmos. That’s why Confucian virtue would not tolerate “the violation of cosmic principles”(shangtianhaili) and patience does not apply to “the vacancy of the humaneness and the cosmic virtue”(renzhiyijin). They feel by heart the conscience of the cosmos that is identical to the ethics of life in nature. Second, the conscience originated from a feeling heart could meticulously transform the physical properties of time and space into the moral senses of the cosmos; when Chinese boast themselves of their consecutive history of 5000 years, they really mean to transmit the message of respect for a sustainable civilization instead of chronological attestation of historical events; when they advocate building a harmonious world or realizing Communism in the world, even inscribe on the memorial gateway in China town the tenet “People within the Four Seas Are Brothers and Sisters”(sihaizhineijiexiongdì), they do not care geographically where they are or biologically whom they meet, they are morally intoxicated in this catchphrase with the cosmic fraternity by the ethical conscience of an intuitional heart assumed in the natural company of everyone. Consequently, Lu’s observations on the relation between heart and cosmos in the fabric of heart-nature-mandate can also serve as the theoretical justification for the popular fever of Chinese intellectual in quoting Zhang Zai, another pioneer Neo-Confucian thinker before Lu Jiuyuan, with his sentences as their life maxims: “To testify a cosmic heart between heaven and earth, to vindicate the heaven’s mandate for all human beings, to accomplish the scholarship of ancient Saints and to bring about universal harmony for future generations.” (Yulan, 2000: Vol.10, p.135) Here by reference, if the purposiveness of nature in Kantian aesthetical judgment is to manifest the man with his holy dignity and to demonstrate the cosmic morality that every man is the end in himself and no man should be employed as means to the end of others, then the Confucian theory of heart-nature-mandate could be introduced into the enlightenment of Kantian critique philosophy. And through Kantian sophisticated exquisiteness of intellectual exposition, I feel marvelously fresh in reevaluating Confucian tradition in the theory of heart-nature-mandate and in the aesthetical judging “the spiritual friends in cold winter” of “pines, bamboos and plum blossom”(suihan sanyou, song zhu mei) as symbols of virtue in up-firmness, absorbing modesty and independent bravery.

V. Conclusion

Aesthetical judgment, in the final analysis, is the subjective faculty of human with his immanent potentiality, aiming at providing epistemological solutions to values rather than fact that would make human moral practice of freedom more substantial and autonomous. Its humanistic purposiveness might create a link between theoretical Understanding and practical Reason, achieving its highest level in absolute good identical to the fullest realization of man in his humanistic possibilities.

If we may, by comparison, claim that theoretical necessity in the Law of Causality helps create a cosmological ontology while the practical necessity in the Moral Law an ethical ontology, we are equally qualified to claim that aesthetical necessity in the Emotional Law help create a beautiful ontology. Moreover, what I termed as beautiful ontology could contribute to the coherence and richness for the metaphysics of Kantian Critique Philosophy. If the mediatory faculty in Judgment vested with self-sufficient structure in the parallel form of quantity, quality, relation and modality to pleasure, beauty, sublimity and good, it will better serve as a traffic hub to connect the natural world with kingdom of freedom, the certainties of natural law and necessities of moral law, the theory and the practice, and the man as animal and the as replica of God. By aesthetical faculty in Kantian Critique Philosophy, human being may be appropriately accounted as “man of culture”, as being contrasted to “man of animal nature” in theoretical realm and “man of morality” in practical realm. With this metaphorical contrast, we might agree to a philosophical personality in the harmony of three dimensions of nature, culture and morality. Based on the aesthetical faculty with progressive ladder steps of purposiveness, Kant has reconciled the conflicting personalities of a man as copy in the image of God with good will and of a man as machine dictated to causality in traditional dogmas. In his edifice of philosophy, man is no more rational animal, or social animal, or emotional animal with their specific features, but a man of modality of all possible good.

Bibliography

Bambrough, Renford 1963. *The Philosophy of Aristotle, with a New Afterword by Susanne Bobzien*. New York: Penguin Group (USA)Inc.

Bernard, J.H. 2005. *Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant, translated with Introductory and Notes*. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Allison, Henry E. 2004. *Kant's Transcendental Idealism, (Revised and Enlarged Edition)*. New Haven:Yale University Press.

Allison, Henry E. 2001. *Kant's Theory of Taste, A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zammito, John H. 1992. *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Yulan, Feng. 2000. *The Complete Works of Feng Yulan(三松堂全集)*, Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press.

Bojun, Yang. 1989. *The Four Books in Modern Chinese (白话四书, translated and interpreted version)*.Changsha: Yuelu Press.

Jiuyuan, Lu. 1980. *The Complete Works of Lu Jiuyuan (陆九渊集)*, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju Press.